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Abstract
A recent IRS ruling has allowed the new Yankees Stadium construction project to be
financed by a tax exempt bond offering backed by payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTS). This
decision appears to contradict the spirit of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. From an economic
standpoint, the question is whether it is desirable to significantly expand the number of projects
eligible for tax subsidies in exchange for a more direct connection between those receiving
benefits from the projects and those paying the taxes, or should the state and municipal bond tax
exemption narrowly extend only to true public works even if this means taxing the populace
more broadly when certain segments of the population are more apt to benefit from certain
projects.
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Introduction
In the spring of 2009 a replacement for venerable Yankee Stadium will open in the Bronx
at a cost of more than $1.3 billion, making it the most expensive stadium construction project to
date in the United States. The financing of this stadium project differs significantly from most
other new sports facility construction projects and represents a significant change in public
policy on the financing of professional sports facilities. Early indications suggest that the
financing method used to build the New Yankees Stadium could serve as a model for many other
sports facility construction projects across the country.
In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued two Private Letter Rulings, Internal
Revenue Service (2006a) and Internal Revenue Service (2006b), that enabled the New Yankees
Stadium construction project to be financed by a tax exempt bond offering backed by payments
in lieu of taxes (PILOTS). This ruling effectively allowed the Yankees access to low interest tax
exempt bonds, as opposed to privately issued taxable bonds that carry a higher interest rate, to
finance the construction of a privately owned sports facility. The IRS Private Letter Ruling was
significant because it appears to circumvent provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that were
intended to curb the use of tax exempt bond financing for the construction of professional sports
facilities.
Following the IRS rulings, tax exempt public bonds were issued to pay for the
construction of the New Yankees Stadium; since interest paid to holders of these bonds are
exempt from federal income taxes, the bonds carry a lower interest rate than private bonds that
are subject to federal income taxes, and over the 30 years between issuance and maturity, this
interest rate differential results in a reduction in interest payments of hundreds of millions of
dollars. The principal and interest on these bonds will be paid by the Yankees out of revenues
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generated in the new stadium. The explicit justification for the PILOT financing scheme was
economic development: the parties involved claim that the new stadium will lead to significant
new economic development in New York City.
This ruling, and the subsequent tax exempt bond issuance, opened the floodgates to an
additional wave of PILOT backed tax exempt bonds for the construction of sports facilities that
shows no signs of slowing. The Yankee PILOT decision raises a number of important economic
policy issues. In this paper, we discuss these policy issues and examine the behavior of the
Yankees following the decision.

MLB’s Anti-Trust Exemption, Franchise Moves, and Public Subsidies
Major League Baseball (MLB) has enjoyed an exemption from anti-trust law for nearly 100
years since the 1922 ruling in Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of
Professional Base Ball Clubs et al. (259 U.S. 200). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
notably Toolson v. New York Yankees (1953) (346 U.S. 356) and Flood v. Kuhn (1972) (407 U.S.
258) have upheld the Federal Baseball precedent while noting that the decision’s underlying
reasoning, that baseball is not interstate commerce, is unquestionably flawed, at least given the
modern development of national media contracts. The courts, however, have not seen fit to
extend the exemption to other sports such as boxing (United States v. International Boxing Club
of New York, 1955, 348 U.S. 236), football (Radovich v. National Football League et al, 1957,
352 U.S. 445, or basketball (Haywood v. National Basketball Association, 1971, 401 U.S. 1204).
Among other consequences, the baseball’s antitrust exemption results in fewer MLB
franchises than would exist absent the exemption. The restriction in the number of MLB
franchises means that markets capable of supporting a MLB franchise do not have one, and the
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existence of these “open” markets provides existing MLB franchises with important leverage
when negotiating with state and local governments over subsidies for the construction of new
baseball stadiums. In addition, this antitrust exemption also provides the league with significant
power to prevent any existing franchises from moving into New York City to fill any void left by
the Mets’ or Yankees’ departure. While the National Football League (NFL), like MLB, also
possesses significant monopoly power, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (1984) (726 F.2d 1381) demonstrated that,
absent an antitrust exemption, the NFL was unable to prohibit the Raiders’ owner, Al Davis,
from moving his football team to Los Angeles despite the league’s wishes for him to stay in
Oakland. Similarly, any threat by the Yankees to leave the New York City metropolitan area
would be an empty one absent the antitrust exemption as any number of small market owners
would jump at the chance to play in a major market like New York City, even in an
unrefurbished Yankees Stadium. Due to the antitrust exemption, however, the Yankees, in
collusion with MLB, could prevent such moves from occurring.
The public financing of the both the new Yankees Stadium and the new Mets stadium
scheduled to open in New York City in the next few years was influenced by threats made by
both the New York Yankees and New York Mets to leave the city of New York. In a
memorandum from Andrew M. Alper to New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg explaining
why the Yankees were granted an exemption from New York City Industrial Development
Agency (NYCIDA) policy, then director Alper stated that failure to give the Yankees what they
wanted would “result in the New York Yankees relocating the Team to a stadium outside the
City.” 1 In another memorandum from Alper to New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
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New York City Industrial Development Agency memorandum “Deviation from Uniform Tax Exemption Policy
for Yankees Ballpark Company.”
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explaining why the Mets were granted a similar exemption from the NYCIDA policy, Alper
stated that failure to give the Mets what they wanted would “result in the New York Mets
relocating the Team to a stadium outside the City of New York.” 2
Based on these two memoranda from the NYCIDA, it appears that both of the MLB
teams in New York City used the threat of leaving to extract concessions from the City of New
York. Again, economic theory provides a clear explanation for why professional baseball teams
have this power: they have significant market power and operate as unregulated monopolies.
Unlike most other industries in the United States, MLB receives special treatment under federal
anti-trust law. Economic theory predicts that monopolies restrict output in order to realize
monopoly rents. In the case of MLB, monopoly power is exercised by limiting the total number
of teams in each league. In this specific case, it means that the Yankees and Mets were able to
force state and local governments to grant them special benefits not available to other firms
because of the anti-trust exemption granted by the Federal Baseball decision. If MLB did not
have this special protection, the Yankees and Mets would not have had another viable alternative
market to threaten to move into. The new stadium construction projects would have been
finance through other, traditional means like private bonds with a higher interest rate or public
tax exempt bonds that would be paid for out of general revenues or other public financing
methods. The IRS ruling effectively turns state and local government into investment bankers
for professional sports teams in New York City, and gives these privately held corporations
access to tax exempt bond funding that was explicitly prohibited by the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
The justification for the deviation granted to both the Yankees and Mets stadiums was a
threat to move out of New York City to another market that would support a professional
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New York City Industrial Development Agency memorandum “Deviation from Uniform Tax Exemption Policy
for Queens Ballpark. L.L.C..”
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baseball team. Again, the ultimate cause of the New York PILOT mess is MLB’s anti-trust
exemption, a public policy decision made by the federal courts that Congress has refused to
overturn for nearly a century.

How PILOTs Differ from Other Stadium Financing
The PILOT decision has resulted in a financing deal for construction of the new Yankee
Stadium that differs in important ways from the way that other new professional sports facilities
have been financed in the post 1986 Tax Reform Act era. Two examples make these differences
clear. Nationals Park opened in Washington, DC on May 4th 2006. The stadium cost $610
million and was financed through the sale of tax exempt bonds issued by the city of Washington.
Because tax exempt bonds were used to finance this stadium, the DC government had to raise
taxes in order to pay the principal and interest on these bonds; these payments must come out of
general tax revenues to comply with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The requirement that the
principal and interest on tax exempt bonds used to finance professional sports facility
construction represents an important limit on the use of tax exempt bonds for this purpose, as
well as a limit on construction costs. Local politicians and bureaucrats are held accountable for
the condition of their budgets by voters, and paying the principal and interest on these bonds out
of general tax revenues has budgetary effects. Because general tax revenues are collected from a
broader group of local residents than the sports fans that enjoy the benefits of a new stadium, this
requirement reduces the amount of money spent on new sports facilities financed using tax
exempt bonds, and may reduce construction costs as well.
AT&T Park, home of the San Francisco Giants, opened on March 31st, 2000. The
stadium cost $357 million to build ($426 million in 2007 dollars) and was privately financed.
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No tax exempt bonds were issued to pay for the facility construction by any state or local
government. The team had to pay a higher interest rate on the borrowed money than they would
have if they had access to tax exempt financing, making the construction project more costly to
the team.
Clearly, the PILOT decision has had a profound effect on the Yankee Stadium
construction project. The access to lower interest rates offered by tax exempt funding, coupled
with the lack of budgetary-related limits on costs has combined to produce the most expensive
stadium construction project in the history of Major League Baseball, and indeed all of
professional sports in North America.

Ticket Prices and New Facilities in MLB
Major League Baseball teams produce a product with only a few imperfect substitutes in
the local economy. Unlike other firms, MLB teams face little competition in the marketplace.
This market power gives MLB teams significant latitude when setting prices. In most cases,
firms facing competition set their prices at a level “that the market will bear,” meaning that these
businesses face significant price competition from other firms that limits their ability to raise
prices. A business with many competitors cannot raise prices too much because their customers
will turn to other suppliers. MLB teams do not face this type of competition. Their product has
few close substitutes, so they can set prices based only on the market demand for their product.
In large markets, like New York City, this market demand can be quite large compared to the
number of tickets sold in any season. The only constraint on price increases faced by
professional sports teams is the willingness of fans to pay in sufficient numbers.
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Porter and Thomas (in press) recently analyzed the political economy of ticket pricing in
new publicly subsidized sports facilities. The model developed in this paper predicts that teams
seeking public subsidies for new facility construction projects price their tickets below the profit
maximizing level prior to the awarding of the subsidy, and then raise ticket prices significantly
after moving into the new facility. This model provides important insights into the price setting
behavior of the Yankees as they move into the new stadium.
Professional baseball teams offer tickets for sale at a wide variety of prices. Although the
cost of attending a MLB game is often expressed in terms of an “average” or “median” ticket
price, this simplification abstracts from actual choices facing consumers, who can have as many
as fifteen different ticket prices to choose from when buying a ticket to a baseball game.
The increase in ticket prices in their new stadium announced by the New York Yankees
has drawn a great deal of attention in the media. In the 2008 season, the Yankees offered season
tickets at 15 different prices, ranging from $12 per game for a full season ticket in the bleachers
to $325 per game for a full season ticket in the “Field Championship” section. The average price
of a season ticket to the Yankees was $106, and the median price was $70. The price of
Yankees’ season tickets in the new stadium in 2009 will range from $2500 per game for a full
season ticket in the “legends” section to $12 per game for a full season ticket in the bleachers. 3
This represents a 139% annual change in the average price of a Yankees ticket, and a 669%
annual increase in the price of the highest ticket price offered.
The average increase in the median price of a Yankees ticket from 2008 to 2009 was 7%,
and the per game price of a season ticket for the bleachers remains unchanged at $12 per game in
the new stadium. Although the team has heralded this as evidence that the “average fan” would
not be priced out of the new stadium, at this time the price of game day bleacher tickets has not
3

Relocation Program Guide for the New Yankee Stadium, Yankees.mlb.com.
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been announced, only full season ticket prices. While there has been no change in the per game
price paid by fans who purchase 81 bleacher tickets in advance, it remains to be seen how much
a game day bleacher ticket (a better indicator of how much the “average fan” will have to pay)
will cost in the new stadium.
Most research on ticket pricing in professional sports focuses on simple average ticket
prices based on the price of all tickets offered by a team. Fort (2004) recently surveyed the
literature on ticket pricing in professional sports; much of this literature uses average prices
across all ticket categories to analyze team pricing decisions. However, as the example of recent
changes in ticket prices made by the Yankees above points out, teams offer tickets for sale at a
number of different price points and do not typically change ticket prices uniformly across all
ticket prices offered. An analysis of changes in the average ticket price may not reflect changes
in ticket prices like those made by the Yankees in advance of their move into their new stadium.
We collected data on the individual prices charged by every MLB team for all tickets
offered over the period 1975-2006, with the exception of the 2002 MLB season. The source of
these MLB ticket price data are the National League Red Book and American League Green
Book that are published annually by MLB. The Red Book and Green Book contain detailed ticket
price data, including a list of the price of every ticket offered for sale to walk up ticket buyers in
each season. The Red Book and Green Book do not contain information about the price of
season tickets, or how many seats were available at each price point.
Based on the ticket price data from the Red Book and Green Book, on average, MLB
teams offered tickets at about six different price levels in any season, with a maximum of fifteen
different ticket price levels offered by a single team, the Arizona Diamondbacks. In part, these
differences in ticket prices reflect differences in the experience of fans: a fan sitting in the first
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row behind home plate experiences the game in a different way that a fan sitting in the last row
of the upper deck. Fans are willing to pay more for the experience of sitting in the first row
behind home plate than they are for the experience of sitting in the last row of the upper deck.
The large number of different prices offered by MLB teams means that they have many options
available to them when changing prices. It also means that changes in the average or median
price of a ticket may not reflect changes in ticket prices across the board.
Table 1: Percent Change in Nominal Change in Ticket Prices in MLB 1975-2006
Teams Playing Teams Playing
In New Facility In Existing Facility
21.01
7.71
14.95
7.51
34.56
9.21
7.21
9.68
17
767

Average Price Increase, All Tickets
Median Price Increase, All Tickets
Average Price Increase, Highest Priced Ticket
Average Price Increase, Lowest Priced Ticket
Number of Team Seasons

Table 1 summarizes the changes in nominal ticket prices from season to season in these
data. Over the period 1975-2006, the average annual increase in the average ticket price charged
by MLB teams playing in the same stadium as the previous season was 7.71%. The average
annual increase in the median ticket price was 7.51%, a similar change. Because MLB teams
offer tickets at many different prices, the change in the average or median ticket price may not
reflect the overall pattern of ticket price changes from year to year. An alternative way of
looking at price changes is to examine how the highest priced tickets and lowest priced tickets
change. The average annual increase in the highest priced ticket offered by MLB teams playing
in the same stadium over the period 1975-2006 was 9.21%. The average annual increase in the
lowest priced ticket offered by MLB teams over this period was 9.68%. Teams playing in
existing stadiums tend to raise the price of tickets at the upper and lower end of the price range
more than tickets in the middle of the price range. These annual price increases are not adjusted
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for inflation, for reasons that will be explained shortly. All of the relative price increases
discussed here would be unchanged if corrected for increases in the overall price level.
MLB teams playing in new stadiums have, on average, increased their prices at a higher
annual rate than teams playing in an existing stadium. The average annual increase in the
average ticket price charged by an MLB team playing in a new stadium over the period 19752006 was 21.01%; the average increase in the median ticket price was 14.95%. There were 17
new baseball stadiums opened during the period 1975-2006. In part, these ticket price increases
reflect a different experience for fans in a new stadium, but they also depend on the market
power of MLB teams. The increases at the top and bottom of the price range charged by MLB
teams differed from the changes in the average or median prices. The average annual increase in
the highest ticket price offered by MLB teams playing in a new stadium was 34.56%. The
average increase in the lowest priced ticket offered was 7.21%. High end tickets tend to see the
biggest price increases when a team moves into a new stadium in MLB.
No MLB team moving into a new stadium in the past 33 years has increased the price of
the most expensive ticket offered for sale as much as the Yankees will in 2009. The 669%
increase by the Yankees is 20 times larger than the average annual increase in the highest ticket
price offered by MLB teams moving into a new stadium, and more than three times larger than
the next largest annual increase in the highest ticket price offered (the Detroit Tigers increased
their highest ticket price by 200% when they moved into their new stadium in 2000.) 4
The annual increase in the average price of a ticket offered by the San Francisco Giants in
2000, the last team to move into a new privately financed stadium was 21.3%; the annual
increase in the highest priced ticket offered by the Giants was 9.52%, and the increase in the

4

Note that we compare the increase in the nominal price of Yankees tickets to the increase in the nominal price of
other tickets because we do not yet know what the inflation rate will be between now and April 2009.
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lowest price ticket offered was 66.6%. Because of the lavish nature of the new stadium, the
Yankees are able to pass on extraordinary ticket price increases to their fans. Access to
relatively low cost tax exempt bonds under the PILOT ruling allowed the Yankees to build the
most expensive baseball stadium in the history of baseball. In addition, part of these
extraordinary ticket price increases may be attributed to strategic behavior on the part of the
Yankees, as predicted by the public choice model of ticket pricing and subsidies developed by
Porter and Thomas (in press).

The Fallacy of New Job Creation in Sports Facility Construction
One clear theme emerges from the financing of the New Yankees Stadium: the primary
economic rationale for the sequence of events that led to the PILOT decision was that the new
Yankee Stadium would be a significant engine of economic growth in the local economy, and
that this alleged economic benefit was sufficient justification for granting this exceptional
privilege to the Yankees. The importance of job creation associated with both the construction
of the new stadium and the ongoing operation of the stadium were mentioned again and again as
the primary justification for the decision in the public and private debate about this project.
The claims of significant economic benefits from sports stadium construction and
operation are problematic. First, they are forecasts, and not actual counts of jobs created or
income earned in and around the new stadium. The new stadium is still under construction, and
the team has not yet played a single game there. In the PILOT issue, and every other sports
facility construction project we have studied, these forecasts of economic benefits are treated as
factual assessments, rather than the forecasts that they are. Forecasts are not useful unless they
contain a measure of the uncertainty associated with them, and the claimed future economic
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benefits from the new Yankee Stadium are never placed in this context. This makes them
useless for informing economic policy decisions. The problem has already surfaced in the
Yankee Stadium PILOT decision, as the claims of thousands of full time jobs made at the time
the exemption was granted has proven to be wildly overstated
Second, there is no evidence in the large body of peer reviewed scholarly research on the
economic impact of professional sports facilities that indicates any professional sports facility
construction project, or the ongoing operation of any such facility has generated any tangible
economic benefits in the local economy. Coates and Humphreys (2008) recently surveyed this
extensive literature. In fact, economists widely agree on this point, and it is backed up by
decades of evidence based on peer reviewed research. Even if the New Yankee Stadium is the
most expensive stadium construction project in history, it will likely not generate any significant
economic benefits in New York City.
Claimed benefits from the construction jobs created during stadium construction projects
are one of the most abused claims of tangible economic benefits made by those seeking
subsidies, because they are so evident. One has to simply drive by the construction site and see it
swarming with workers to confirm these claims of economic benefits in the community.
However, there is more to this situation than meets the eye. The key to determining the actual
net economic benefits generated by sports stadium construction projects is to determine how
many jobs are created that would not have existed if the project did not take place, and also to
determine how many of the workers filling those jobs would have been unemployed if the
project had not taken place. According to economic theory, only this small subset of the total
number of jobs created by a stadium construction project can be counted as part of the economic
impact of the project. Calculating this number cannot be accomplished by a simple inspection of
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the construction sight, and assuming that every worker observed on the job site represents new
economic benefit to the local economy is erroneous.
The net economic benefit created by stadium construction projects is much smaller than
the total economic benefit (which can be easily found by simply adding up the total amount of
spending associated with the project) because of the presence of opportunity costs, and the
double counting that typically takes place when non-economists attempt to estimate these
benefits. Opportunity cost is the cost of forgone alternatives. In the case of the New Yankee
Stadium, the facility generates significant opportunity costs for the City of New York and in the
local community. The City could have issued a billion plus dollars of tax exempt bonds to
finance any number of alternatives. The testimony of Seth Pinsky, president of the NYCIDA
before the New York State Assembly on July 2nd 2008 indicates that his agency receives
hundreds of requests each year for public tax exempt funding for construction projects. 5 The
materials and supplies that are going into the construction of the new stadium could have been
used on other construction projects. And most importantly, the construction workers employed
on this project could have worked on other project. Economic theory tells us that only those
construction workers who would not have had a job if the stadium was not built can be counted
as net economic benefit from the project. According to a recent Bureau of Labor Statistics press
release, the unemployment rate for construction workers in August 2008 was 1.9%. 6 This low
unemployment rate means that the actual number of new construction jobs created by the New
Yankee Stadium project was a tiny fraction of the total number of jobs created by the project.

5

Transcript from July 2nd 2008 public hearing: The Request for Increased Public Financing for Construction of a
New Yankee Stadium in New York City, hearing before the Assembly Standing Committee on Corporations,
Authorities and Commissions.
6
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t11.htm
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The prospects for long-term economic benefits as a result of ongoing operation of the
stadium are equally dim. While it is undoubtedly true that the new stadium will attract in excess
of 4 million fans per year to its location in the Bronx, the old stadium, which stands just one
block south of the new facility, has drawn over 4 million fans per year for each of the four years,
and indeed the new stadium promises to draw fewer fans to the area due to the fact that its
capacity is nearly 6,000 seats smaller than old Yankees Stadium. Furthermore, the new stadium
provides significantly improved eating and drinking options inside the stadium, driving
economic activity away from the local neighborhoods and into the stadium itself.

Untended Consequences of the PILOT Decision
Despite the unseemly events surrounding the financing plan for the New Yankees
Stadium in the Bronx, from one perspective, the financing of this new baseball stadium has
desirable features from an economic perspective. Zimmerman (1997) pointed out that the
desirability of tax exempt financing of professional sports facilities depends on the application of
the benefit principle of taxation to the financing deal, and the ultimate goal of public policy on
professional sports facilities. If the elimination of all public subsidies for the construction of new
professional sports facilities is the policy goal, then the Yankee PILOT ruling is a disaster. It
opens up a new avenue for the subsidization of professional sports and effectively guts the
prohibitions against the use of tax exempt bonds to finance new sports facility construction
projects in the 1986 Tax Reform Act without the consent of the U.S. Congress and will lead to
even larger subsidies for the construction of professional sports facilities. Indeed, there is little
reason to believe that such subsidization will stop with professional sports franchises. Given the
weak theoretical and empirical foundations upon which the Yankees’ claim of promoting
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economic development rests, nearly any enterprise could claim that their own capital
expenditures promote economic development with equal credibility.
On the other hand, if the goal of public policy on subsidies for the construction of
professional sports facilities is to formulate public policies that conform to the benefit principle
of taxation (also known as the “user-pays principle”), the Yankee PILOT decision is an
improvement. Prior to the Yankees PILOT decision, funds to pay off tax exempt bonds issued to
finance professional sports facility construction projects typically came from general tax
revenues, specific broad based revenue generation programs like lotteries, rental car taxes, or
hotel taxes, or other sources of funds like Tax Increment Financing (TIF) districts. Using
government revenues from broad based sources like sales, property or income taxes violates the
benefit principle of taxation because the beneficiaries of the subsidies, team owners, professional
athletes, and fans of the team, are a small segment of the local economy while the group who pay
for the subsidy, taxpayers, are a much larger group.
Under the Yankees PILOT ruling, the tax exempt bonds issued to finance construction of
the new stadium will be paid using revenues generated by the team in the new facility. Fans of
the team who attend games, and to the extent that the incidence of this effective tax also falls on
the team are the primary source of these revenues, the team itself, will pay off the tax exempt
bonds. So under the Yankees PILOT ruling, the beneficiaries of the subsidy bear the cost.
It is important to note that this is a second best outcome, because the federal government
is still forgoing the tax revenues that would have been collected if the new Yankee Stadium
would have been financed using private, taxable bonds. In this sense, all federal taxpayers are
subsidizing the Yankees in their fans by an amount equal to the forgone federal tax revenues.
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However, this subsidy would still exist of the tax exempt bonds were paid off using general tax
revenues.
Ultimately policy-makers will soon be forced to make some serious decisions regarding
the funding of private construction projects. The question boils down to whether it is desirable
to significantly expand the number of projects eligible for tax subsidies in exchange for a more
direct connection between those receiving benefits from the projects and those paying the taxes,
or should the state and municipal bond tax exemption narrowly extend only to true public works
even if this means taxing the populace more broadly when certain segments of the population are
more apt to benefit from certain projects. The IRS’s decision in the case of Yankee Stadium
appears to contradict, at the very least, the spirit of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Given this
contradiction, the issue should elicit renewed legislative and judicial attention.
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